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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. ) Case No. 881202-CA 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, ) 
District Court No. 67,254 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
ARGUMENT 
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S ASSERTIONS, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT THERE HAD OCCURRED A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT AN INCREASE IN CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
In her reply brief, plaintiff-respondent relies in total 
on testimony relating to deposits made to appellants personal 
and business checking account for calendar year 1986. 
The evidence at trial was that a substantial majority of 
deposits to appellant's personal checking account represented 
loans from his personal line of credit, which funds were either 
used to consolidate or pay off existing debt or which funds 
were deposited to the business cheeking account to sustain his 
accounting practice during slow economic times. These deposits 
from his personal checking account to his business checking 
account overstated his cash receipts significantly and created 
the duplicate deposits ignored by both the court and counsel 
for respondent. The evidence further shows that when loans 
were subsequently repaid, the monies were transferred from 
appellant's business checking account to his personal checking Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
account, from which checks were drawn to re-pay the lending 
institution, again resulting in duplicate deposits. 
As irrelevant as bank deposits are to the issue of "gross 
income," respondent failed to produce any evidence of bank 
deposits for appellant's personal and business checking 
accounts for calendar year 1984, the year of the divorce. In 
fact the only comparable evidence regarding the income of both 
appellant and respondent at the time of the divorce trial was 
appellants monthly draw of $2,349.00 and respondent gross 
monthly income of $537*00. Furthermore, the only evidence 
presented at the modification trial was that respondent's 
income had increased to $1,421.00 per month and that 
appellant's monthly gross income was $1,242.00. 
Although respondent relies on appellants 1983 income tax 
return to justify a finding of a substantial change in 
circumstances, the record reflects that the information 
contained in appellant's 1983 tax return was neither available 
nor was the return prepared nor filed until 30 days after entry 
of the Amended Decree of Divorce . This substantiates the fact 
that the court, in establishing appellant's obligation to pay 
child support and alimony at the time of the divorce relied on 
appellant's draw of $2,349.00 as contained in his Exhibit 19. 
Plaintiff as the petitioning party has the burden to 
prove a substantial change in circumstances. Mitchel v. 
Mitchel, 668 P2d 561 (Utah 1983). She failed in that burden. 
Even the court recognized how far afield it had gone when it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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admitted at p. 43 of the partial Transcript that it "did not 
know how to approach this case". 
The court further demonstrated its obvious disregard for 
present case law when at a post trial hearing to hear 
appellant's objections to proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law the court admitted "I don't think there's 
any authority for this kind of conclusion that I came to when I 
heard this evidence." (Transcript of Hearing, P. 11 LL 3-9) 
The courts finding of a substantial change in circumstances in 
this case is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (1988) 
Counsel for respondent incorrectly represents that the 
Christiansen case cited in his brief stands for the proposition 
that if a person owns his own business and he co-mingles 
personal funds with his business accounts, that the court may 
consider both the individual income and business income in 
considering a petition for modification of child support. 
Christiansen vs. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 529 (Utah 1983). 
That is not the rule set out in Christiansen, nor are the 
facts of the Christiansen case comparable to the case at issue 
here. In the Christiansen case the court was concerned with a 
corporation which was wholly owned by one of the parties to the 
divorce. As a corporation, the business filed separate tax 
returns and showed a profit as an entity separate and apart 
from it's owner. In the case now before the court, the 
business of appellant is a proprietorship. As such all of the 
income of the business and all of the expenses of the business 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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are reflected on appellant's personal income tax return. At 
the time of trial, none of the expenses reflected on 
appellant's tax return were questioned or objected to by either 
counsel for respondent or by the court. Appellant agrees that 
the current state of the law in Utah is that the court can take 
into consideration in it's deliberations of whether there has 
been a substantial change in circumstances, the value of any 
direct financial benefits a party may receive from his 
personally owned business. No such evidence was presented at 
the time of the modification trialr however. The only evidence 
regarding appellant's current gross income at the time of the 
modification trial was his 1986 income tax return, which 
reflected a gross income for the year in the amount of 
$14,907.68. 
Respondent offered no evidence regarding any financial 
benefit appellant was or presently is receiving from his 
personally owned accounting business. Because the court had 
apparently made up it's mind to arbitrarily increase 
appellant's child support obligation, it read into the record 
facts and evidence which either were not offered at the trial 
or were irrelevant to the proceedings. 
Even if the court had sufficient evidence to conclude that 
appellants income had increased significantly, such an increase 
in income alone does not automatically justify an increase in 
his child support obligations Owen v. Owen, 579 P2d 911 (Utah). 
CONCLUSIONS 
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In it's ruling, without any evidence to substantiate it's 
conclusion, the court accused appellant of maintaining a high 
standard of living. It based that conclusion on (1) 
appellant's ownership of real and personal property all of 
which appellant was awarded at the time of the original divorce 
decree, and none of which contributes income to assist 
appellant in paying his court ordered child support, and (2) 
the court's perception of appellant's past ability to borrow 
money, which to date has never been justification for 
increasing a non-custodial parent's child support obligation. 
The evidence does not support a finding of a substantial 
change in circumstances. Furthermore, as a separate issue, the 
evidence does not justify an increase in child support, even if 
there is a finding that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, the trial court's notion that a parent's 
ability to borrow should be a factor in determining his or her 
ability to pay child support is novel indeed. Needless to say 
that if that now becomes the standard for determining a 
parent's ability to pay child support, then in accordance with 
Ebbert, a parent's credit worthiness would be tantamount to 
imputing the wealth and income of appellant's creditors to 
appellant. Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah). That is 
not the law in Utah nor would such an interpretation of the law 
be in the best interest of children entitled to support from 
their parents. 
Respectfully submitted this fty day of January, 1989. 
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